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Mr. Chairman, this morning one of the brethren raised an
embarrassing question. He asked, "Why in the world did they in-
vite a dean to talk about research?" I tried to laugh it off, but to
make sure that I got the point, he continued, "Don't you know that
everything you say will be incompetent under the hearsay rule?"
Finally, taking no chances, he asked, "Is it vicarious scholarship
you are going to talk about?"
But however vulnerable I may be to these thrusts, I am glad
of an opportunity to express a few ideas on legal research and the
responsibilities of universities and other institutions. I think that
the current situation as to legal research is highly unsatisfactory.
We are all deeply impressed with the achievements of research
in physical and biological sciences. And we have heard much about
how our knowledge in these fields has outstripped our knowledge
of human relations and social institutions. Much has been said of
the necessity of stimulating research in these latter fields. Founda-
tion reports have indicated a keen awareness of the need of re-
search in the social sciences. At Chicago Mr. Hutchins has reason
to fear that he will go down in the history of the university as the
president under whom the development of research in physical and
biological sciences far outstripped the development in the humani-
ties and social sciences.
One would expect that a period in which we are conscious of
these lags would see an increase in the funds available for legal re-
search, as well as research in psychology, economics, and other so-
cial disciplines. But this is not the situation which we face. Founda-
tion grants are difficult to secure for legal research or for projects
combining law and other social disciplines. At the University of
Chicago teaching and research in medicine are supported by ap-
propriations over ten times those made available for law. I do not
forget the high cost of laboratories, but a ratio of over ten to one
needs some explaining.
I have a theory as to how this situation has come about. I
think it results partly from the fact that we have been somewhat
confused as to what legal research is and what its methods are.
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Being thus confused, we have been diffident about the results
which can be expected and we have been timid in pressing the
claims of legal research upon the budgeteers with whom we deal.
One source of the confusion as to the nature and methods of
legal research is, I think, a worship of the methods of the natural
sciences, an attitude which we lawyers often share with other social
scientists. Now I do not belittle the exact research in the natural
sciences or the general ideal of scientific research which such in-
vestigations set before researchers in any field. My point is that
perfectionist attitudes and efforts have tended to discredit and
handicap other useful types of research in law.
For example, I suppose that many of you are familiar with
Underhill Moore's inquiries into the effectiveness of legal regula-
tion. He attempted to secure precise information as to the relation
between law and behavior, correlations between changes in regula-
tions and changes in behavior. To obtain conditions appropriate
for the use of techniques of empirical science, he chose a relatively
simple field, that of parking regulations in certain areas of New
Haven. Arrangements were made with the city authorities for ex-
perimental changes in the regulations, and "before and after" tabu-
lations of the behavior of motorists were made in great detail. On
the basis of these observations, Moore developed algebraic formulae
expressing the relations between the variables studied. True to
the traditions of science, he cautioned against assuming that the
generalizations would be valid for parking regulations in other
cities, or in other parts of New Haven, or for laws or regulations of
other kinds. He claimed only to illustrate a method of study by
which in some areas of law accurate knowledge might be obtained.
It is apparent, I think, that such a method could be used in
relatively few fields of law and it is my hunch, furthermore, that
the generalizations which might thus be secured would be rela-
tively unimportant. My principal objection, however, is to Moore's
negative pronouncements. For example, after describing his ob-
jective of precise knowledge of specific effects of law on behavior,
he added that "until such knowledge is available, any discussion
of the relative desirability of alternative social ends which may be
achieved by law is largely day dreaming, and any discussion of
the engineering method by which law may be used to achieve those
ends is largely futile." I suppose that few of us actually agree with
such statements but we often speak apologetically of research
which falls short of such standards or which does not at least
utilize statistical methods.
If we are guilty of day dreaming, I think that some of our
fantasies deal with scientific research in law, and the Johns Hop-
kins Institute of Law has had perhaps its most far reaching in-
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fluence in keeping alive these fantasies. The Institute was martyred
by the depression, cut off before the utility of its elaborate statistical
procedures could fairly be tested.
Particularly here in Ohio, in cooperation with the Judicial
Council and the State Bar Association, the Institute conducted ex-
tensive studies as to the conduct of litigation and other aspects of
judicial administration. I am of course not in a position to criticize
these studies, though I should like to hear from some of you Ohio-
ans as to what use has been made of these researches and as to the
soundness of the methods used.
What I can say -and what I want to say without apology and
with enthusiasm - is that there is much useful and scholarly work
to be done that does not use statistical techniques and which falls
far short of the standards of research in the natural sciences -
work which we can appropriately include in the category of re-
search. Let me give just a few examples of studies which I think
are of great importance, wide usefulness and high quality, yet in
none of which were strictly scientific techniques used. Take Bon-
bright's Valuation of Property, the product of a ten-year coopera-
tive study at Columbia covering valuation for various legal pur-
poses. Then there is the Frankfurter and Landis study of the Busi-
ness of the Supreme Court and Henderson's Position of Foreign
Corporations in American Constitutional Law and Sharfman's
treatise on the I.C.C.
I have chosen varied examples, none of them traditional legal
treatises, all of them of great value and originality and certainly
the product of research.
From what sources are we to expect the principal support for
legal research in the future? In the last decades, much excellent
work has come from staffs of government agencies, like the SEC
study of protective committees and corporate reorganization. Some
of the monographs commissioned for the TNEC belong in the same
category. Even the best of these, however, suggest the need for
research under private auspices.
One might expect that university law schools would be centers
of such work just as medical schools are centers of advance of medi-
cal knowledge. The cold fact is that there are few law schools with
budgets which make possible more than a token program of legal
research. We talk of establishing law centers and imply that a
law school should be a center of constructive criticism of the law,
but the law center may turn out to be merely a new building for
the law school -with no increase of support for legal research.
If high quality research is to come out of law schools we need
larger faculties, with reduction of teaching load for men engaged
in research. We need close relations, of course, with research per-
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sonnel in Economics and other related fields. At Chicago, for ex-
ample, we have on the law school faculty three economists whose
principal responsibilities are in the research field.
It is vital, furthermore, that a research program should not
be regarded as a luxury item, the first to be cut or eliminated when
budget revenues decrease. This is a point which I emphasize with
peculiar pain.
I have spoken thus far without mention of our law reviews.
The field of law is unique in the number of outlets for publishing
in article form the results of research. There are almost fifty law
journals published in this country. I need not dwell on the value
of these journals; there is more need that we be reminded of the
problem created by their large number. My boss, President Col-
well, has indicated the problem in an address to directors of uni-
versity presses:
When it becomes mandatory for any professional school
or major department in any university to publish a
learned journal, social irresponsibility and academic hum-
bug can go no further. I realize that any example is in-
vidious; so I choose one well qualified in the arts of self-
defense. There are forty-four journals published by law
schools with university standing or connections in this
country. There is not enough legal scholarship in the coun-
try to fill these journals. The same thing would be true in
other fields. These are not learned journals, but house
organs. Their number and pattern are a threat rather than
a help to the interests of scholarship.
These blunt words may reveal an unfamiliarity with the value
of various types of law review articles to the practising attorney -
including articles dealing with problems in a single state. But
what law review editor can plead entire innocence of resorting to
inferior material to meet dead-line emergencies? And has not the
easy availability of publication sometimes encouraged hasty and
superficial work? Then, too, I must admit that President Colwell's
blast has set me thinking about the appropriate division of the
burden of publication costs between the universities and the pro-
fession, whether through subscription prices or bar association or
other professional subsidies. I am not at all sure that our present
practices in this respect represent the ultimate wisdom on the
subject. Of one thing I am sure-that in soliciting financial sup-
port for programs of legal research we will be called upon to ac-
count of our stewardship with respect to law reviews.
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